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Abstract-Securing group communications in resource constrained, 
infrastructure-less environments such as Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs) has become one of the most challenging 
research directions in the areas of wireless network security. 
MANETs are emerging as the desired environment for an 
increasing number of commercial and military applications, 
addressing also an increasing number of users. Security on the 
other hand, is becoming an indispensable requirement of our 
modern life for all these applications. The inherent limitations of 
such dynamic and resource-constraint networks impose major 
difficulties in establishing a suitable secure group communications 
framework. This is even more so for the operation of Key 
Agreement (KA), under which all parties contribute equally to the 
group key. The logical design of efficient KA protocols has been 
the main focus of the related research to-date. Such a 
consideration however, gives only a partial account on the 
feasibility and actual performance of a KA protocol in a real 
multi-hop network. This is because protocols have been evaluated 
only in terms of the group key related messaging in isolation from 
the underlying network functions that interact with the logical 
scheme and support its correct execution (i.e. routing).  In this 
work, we contribute towards efficiently extending a number of 
Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based group KA protocols in wireless multi-
hop ad hoc networks, and measuring their actual performance 
over these networks. Towards this end, we introduce a number of 
new algorithms and techniques that aim in efficiently merging the 
logical design of KA protocols with the underlying routing and 
topology of the network, to produce protocols that substantially 
improve one or more metrics of interest. Indeed, the resulting 
protocols are significantly more efficient in some or all of the 
above metrics, as our analytical and simulation results indicate.  
Index Terms—Key Agreement, Diffie Hellman, Approximations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A MANET is a collection of wireless mobile nodes, 
communicating among themselves over possibly multi-hop 
paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base 
stations or access points. As the development of multicast 
services such as secure conferencing, visual broadcasts, 
military command and control grows, the research on security 
for wireless multicasting becomes increasingly important. The 
role of key management (KM) is to ensure that only valid 
members have access to a valid group key at any time. It is 
essential to develop a secure, robust KM scheme for group 
communications in these environments. The operation of Key 
Agreement (KA) is a subset of the broad KM functionality and 
imposes that all participants contribute (almost) equally to the 
group key establishment, by interacting among themselves in 
ways designated by the specific protocol applied. Compared to 
other tasks classified under KM, such as this of key 
distribution, KA operates on an inherently more complicated 
communication regulation mechanism. The characteristics of 
MANETs constitute the major challenge for the design of 
suitable KM schemes and have even more severe impact on the 
operation of KA. We are dealing with dynamic, infrastructure-
less networks of limited bandwidth, unreliable channels where 
topology is changing fast. Network nodes have limited 
capacity, computational or transmission power. Connections 
are temporary (mobility changes, battery drainage, poor 
physical protection) and unreliable. These constraints turn 
most of the existing protocols inefficient in MANETs. Along 
with the continuous quest for the design of more efficient 
schemes than the existing ones, the need for the new KA 
schemes to handle successfully and tolerate network dynamics 
and failures with low impact in a network with large number of 
nodes is now equally important. Upon failures and disruptions, 
it is often the case that a KA protocol must restart the group 
key establishment process from scratch. Whenever this event 
occurs (may be too often), the underlying routing is invoked 
once again, a significant amount of relays become involved in 
the exchange of large keying messages, and considerable delay 
(reflected in the total number of rounds for the successful 
termination) burdens the network. The overall performance of 
the protocols degrades even more because of the indirect 
impact of excessive routing on additional network layers (i.e. 
QoS deteriorates due to more collisions at the MAC layer, the 
bandwidth usage and the consumption of network resources 
increase undesirably). In MANETs, bandwidth and power 
consumption are valuable resources, and nodes cannot afford 
to waste. For all these reasons, reducing the combined costs 
resulting from the routing and communication exchanges 
among nodes becomes essential if we want to apply more 
sophisticated KA schemes on a resource-constrained MANET.  
   The logical design and analysis of efficient KA protocols has 
been the main focus of the related research to-date. Such a 
consideration however, gives only a partial account on the 
feasibility and actual performance of a KA protocol in a wire-
less multi-hop network. This happens because the evaluation 
of the protocols is conducted via a logical abstraction of the 
underlying physical network in such a way that some essential 
inseparable otherwise operations, such as the underlying 
routing, are left out. However, when evaluating the direct 
adaptations of KA protocols for multi-hop wire-less networks, 
the vast majority of them lose their “claimed” efficiency 
properties. On the other hand, it might be the case that these 
schemes naturally exploit inherent features of the physical 
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network, such as topological redundancies and localization of 
communications that could be improving their efficiency.   
   In this work, we contribute towards efficiently extending a 
number of GDH KA protocols on wireless multi-hop ad hoc 
networks (i.e. GDH.1, GDH.2, ING), and measuring their 
actual performance over these networks. Towards this end, we 
introduce a number of new algorithms that aim in efficiently 
merging the logical design of KA with the underlying routing 
and topology of the network, to produce protocols that 
substantially improve one or more metrics of interest. This is 
achieved by extending the studied protocols from a logical to a 
physical network graph and by allowing the formation of their 
communication schedules with respect to the underlying 
routing and topology. The original protocol versions do not 
exploit members’ topological proximity in general. A pre-
agreed schedule is used, based on members’ attributes, like 
their “hashed” IPs or IDs. After our extension, we see that the 
routing structure of each protocol poses a different 
optimization problem (usually NP-complete) for each of the 
given metrics. Given that, we focus on generating efficient 
approximations that significantly improve the performance of 
the discussed schemes. In our previous work, we imposed that 
the secure group graph is connected. In this paper, we are 
addressing far more generic and realistic scenarios (networks 
where the member graph is not rigorously connected, i.e. non-
member relays may be included in the path of two connected 
members). Our newly introduced heuristics achieve much 
better approximations of the metric functions we want to 
optimize. The comparison between the new topology oriented 
and the original schemes is done via simulations.  
   Section 2 gives an overview of related work on KA and 
section 3 describes the original schemes. Section 4 gives an 
outline of both our previous and current work. We describe the 
network model, assumptions and specifications made in either 
case and we point out the differences. We adequately motivate 
our intension to pursue new directions and extend our work on 
a different setting than this adopted previously. In section 5 we 
provide a detailed overview of our new algorithms and 
heuristics. In section 6 we present the performance analysis of 
our required auxiliary framework. In section 7 we present the 
simulations set-up and our simulation results which clearly 
point out the superiority of our new heuristics, and attest to the 
validity of our analytical results regarding the auxiliary 
framework. Finally, in section 8 we conclude the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
   Proposals related to secure group KA protocols abound in 
the literature, and can be usually found under the broad 
category of contributory schemes. Most of them correspond to 
a logical consideration in terms of design, or address wire-line 
networks and cannot operate as such in MANETs.  
  Becker et al. [1], derived lower bounds for contributory key 
generation systems for the gossip problem and proved them 
realistic for Diffie-Hellman (DH) based protocols. They used 
the basic DH distribution [3] extended to groups from the work 
of Steiner et al. [2], where three new protocols are presented: 
GDH.1-2-3. Ingemarsson et al. [4] presented another efficient 
DH-based KA scheme, “ING”, logically implemented on a 
ring topology. In addition, Burmester et al. [5] introduced a 
new GDH protocol, denoted as BD (very efficient in terms of 
round complexity). Another hybrid DH-based KA scheme is 
TGDH introduced by Kim et al. [7]. It is an efficient protocol 
that blends binary key trees with DH key exchanges. Becker in 
[1], introduced Hypercube, that requires the minimum number 
of rounds. Becker also introduced Octopus scheme as one that 
requires minimum number messages and then derived the 2d-
Octopus that combined Octopus with Hypercube to a very 
efficient scheme that works for arbitrary number of nodes. 
Related work can be found in [6, 8, 9] as well. 
    There exist some more recent proposals of KA for wireless 
ad-hoc networks. Even these, do not seem to scale well or 
handle successfully the network dynamics. Some of these 
approaches rely on public key cryptography, which is very 
expensive for resource constrained nodes, or on threshold 
cryptography [14-19], which results in high communication 
overhead, and does not scale well. Katz et al. [10, 11], improve 
on existing KA schemes either by rendering them more 
scalable or by enhancing their security against various kinds of 
attacks. Still, the described algorithms are implemented on 
logical graphs, or address wire-line networks. Amir et al. [12, 
13], focus on robust KA, and attempt to make GDH protocols 
fault-tolerant to asynchronous network events. However, their 
scheme is designed for the Internet, and requires an underlying 
reliable group communication service and message ordering, 
so that preservation of virtual semantics is guaranteed. In [20], 
it is shown that the consideration of the physical location of 
members is critical for developing energy-efficient KM 
schemes, and based on this observation a new energy-aware 
KM scheme is proposed. In [22], additional Octopus protocols 
for robust and efficient group communications in MANETs are 
proposed. The primary focus of this work is the logical 
evaluation of the proposed schemes, in isolation from network 
functions that interact with them. In [23], we study the 
extension of a number of known KA protocols over multi-hop 
ad hoc networks. The investigation conducted sets the 
foundations for our current study, but it is quite preliminary as 
it addresses a rather specialized network environment, and 
there seems to be much scope for improvement anyway. 
III. ORIGINAL GDH-BASED SCHEMES (OVERVIEW) 
  Even though the original versions of the logical design of the 
GDH schemes we are studying are well documented in our 
references [2, 3, 4, 5], we give a more detailed and simplified 
description of their basic operation in this section, in order to 
make it easier for the reader to follow the next sections. 
Notation_1: Let B(x) = ax be the blinding (exponentiation 
under base a) of value x and letϕ (x) = x mod n. We assume 
that all exponentiations are modular (MEs). In this analysis, 
the modular reduction ϕ (x) of a secret value x, prior to its 
blinding, B(ϕ (x)), is implicitly assumed, but not reflected to 
our equations, for ease of the notation. Hence, we replace the 
expression ( ( ))B xϕ  with B(x). 
GDH1: This protocol assumes that all parties are connected 




stages: up-flow (collecting members’ contributions) and down-
flow (allowing all members to compute the common key). In 
the up-flow, each member performs 1 ME and the message 
between Mi and Mi+1 contains i intermediate values. After 
obtaining Kn, Mn initiates the down-flow stage. Each member 
Mi performs i MEs: 1 to compute Kn and (i-1) to provide 
intermediate values to lower indexed members, by raising them 
to the power of its own exponent. The size of the down-flow 
message decreases on each link, as a message between Mi+1 
and Mi includes i intermediate values. 
GDH2: In order to reduce the total number of rounds, GDH.1 
is slightly varied, so that: a) in the up-flow stage each member 
has to compose i intermediate values (each with i-1 exponents) 
and one cardinal value with i exponents; Mn is the first member 
to compute the key Kn and the last batch of intermediate values, 
b) in the down-flow stage Mn broadcasts the (n-1) intermediate 
values to all group members. It is assumed that all parties are 
connected through a logical Hamiltonian path. The last party 
on the path can reach all others using a broadcast channel. 
ING: The protocol is executed on a virtual Hamiltonian ring. It 
requires that all parties are connected according to a logical 
ring, and completes in (n-1) rounds after a synchronous start-
up. In any round, every party raises the previously-received 
intermediate key value to the power of its own random 
exponent and forwards the result to the next party. After (n-1) 
rounds everyone computes the same key.   
IV. PREVIOUS AND CURRENT APPROACH: NETWORK MODEL, 
SPECIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
In this section we provide an overview of our previous work on 
this topic. We describe the network model, the requirements 
and assumptions for the methods used in [23], and we well 
justify our motivation for extending and evolving this work to 
accommodate our new objectives and directions. Our previous 
work will serve as a starting point for our current approach. We 
focus on the differences in the two methodologies and discuss 
our need to look for more general and efficient approximations 
than those previously introduced. 
Notation_2: The prefix “nt” abbreviates the extension of the 
discussed KA schemes on a wireless multi-hop network with 
“no topology” considerations, and the prefix “wt” (i.e. with 
topology considerations) abbreviates the topologically oriented 
extensions respectively. 
Notation_3: Let n be the number of members in the secure 
group, and m be the number of nodes in the network (size S). 
Also, let D be the diameter diam(G) of the network graph G; 
that is, the max number of hops between a pair of nodes in V. 
Also, let R (Ni, Ni+1) = Ri,i+1 be the number of hops in the path 
between two members Ni and Ni+1, where Ri,i+1≤D. 
Notation_4: K is the bit size of an element in the algebraic 
group used (where the decision DH problem is assumed hard). 
A. Existing Approach Setting and Results (Starting Point) 
In [23], we re-evaluated the KA protocols discussed by using a 
natural implementation of routing, and broadcast/unicast 
operations; specifically, by executing the protocols blindly on 
a real network, where multi-path routing is required for group 
members to communicate, and where not all members can be 
directly reached via single broadcast. We ran those protocols 
on top of this framework using a communication schedule that 
is based merely on arbitrary member IDs. This “nt” approach 
may lead to excessive routing and produce unnecessary relay 
nodes, and consequently high communication cost, as we can 
also see from Table I of our relevant results. These results are 
very indicative of the actual communication overhead and 
rounds that will be incurred from these protocols when applied 
on a multi-hop network, even if the associated logical key 
generation algorithm appears to be very efficient (the original 
versions of the studied KA protocols are merely the key 
generation algorithms run on a logical framework). 
TABLE I 
PERFORMANCE OF KA PROTOCOLS WITHOUT TOPOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 Logical Lt Logical CCost nt-Lt nt-CCost 
ING n-1 n(n-1) D(n-1) Dn(n-1) 
GDH1 2(n-1) n(n-1) 2D(n-1) Dn(n-1) 
GDH2 n (n-1)(n/2+2) Dn Dn(n-1)/2 
Table 1: Performance of: (a) KA protocols over logical networks, (b) nt-
extension of KA protocols over multi-hop ad hoc networks. 
  We then tried to improve the efficiency of each protocol by 
exploring the potential of optimizing their combined routing 
and communication costs with the use of a wt simulation of the 
logical network over an arbitrary network graph G. We used a 
rather restraining model of the connectivity among group 
members: the secure group graph is defined as G(V,E,w), 
where E∈V×V, and w is the edge weight function that maps 
any edge e in G to an integer, s.t.: w: (i, j)→  Z* , e(i, 
j)∈V×V . An edge between any two members (i, j) exists if 
and only if the members are within each other’s radio range 
(bidirectional connectivity). We impose that these members 
have distance of 1-hop, or equivalently w(eij) = 1. Hence, any 
direct link has weight 1, and any path that connects two 
members indirectly consists only of group members. For ease 
of the notation we set: G(V,E,w) = G(V,E,1) = G(V, E).  
  We further assumed that each message from a member in G is 
timely sent (i.e., there is no congestion) and reliably and timely 
received by all neighbors. Our schemes inherit the same 
security properties as those of their original ancestors. Our 
main objective was to meet efficiency requirements of low 
communication overhead and latency for the group key 
establishment during the initial state of key generation. We 
assumed that the underlying routing is capable of establishing 
end to end paths, avoiding intermediate link failures. We did 
not consider dynamic cases (i.e. link failure, mobility) under 
which the network could be partitioned. The behavior of the 
protocols at steady state (i.e. re-keying operation) was not 
considered within the scope of that work. 
  Under the nt communication schedule, members’ placement 
and consequently the routes formed are random. Then, the 
corresponding physical graph is not expected to resemble the 
logical graph – hence, it is not optimal. This arbitrary factor 
that emerges when we merge the key generation algorithm 
“blindly” with the underlying routing is what we try to capture, 




and later focused on minimizing the following 6 quantities, or 
performance metrics (scaled down by K):  
Communication Cost (CCost):  
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× ×∑    (2),               
 CCost3 = (n-1)Bn   (3), 
 Latency (Lt):  
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∑     (5),             
Lt3 = max_length (Bn)    (6). 
 Each protocol poses two different optimization problems as its 
routing structure defines a specific optimization function for 
each of the two metrics of latency (Lt) and combined 
communication cost (CCost). Given these quantities, we 
developed bounds for the two metrics of each protocol as 
follows: ING: from (1) and (4), GDH.1: from (2) and (5), 
GDH.2: from (2), (3), (5), and (6). 
 The solutions to most of these functions can be mapped to NP-
complete problems, e.g. (1), (4), (5) are mapped to the 
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). Thus, finding 
approximations of the optimal solutions to these quantities, 
result in more efficient metrics for the protocols.  
 We then proposed a number of heuristics (details can be found 
in [23]), most of which rely on an auxiliary framework that 
includes the generation of a tree that spans all n members of 
the secure group. This spanning tree (ST) has the following 
property by definition of the associated network graph G: the 
weight of any link that directly connects any two tree members 
is 1. In this case, this ST is in fact a minimum ST (MST). This 
equivalence allows us to use some approximations based on 
the existence of an MST over the group members. We briefly 
quote all the approximation used below: 
1) Solution to (1), (4), (5): Full Walk on the MST 
2) Solution to (2), (4): Extended ING ring with dilation 2 
3) Solution to (2): Closest Point Heuristic 
4) Solution to (3), (6): Broadcast Tree 
Indeed, by using these approximations to set up a wt schedule, 
the performance of the studied KA schemes was significantly 
improved by at least a factor of D (or n) in most cases, in 
contrast to the arbitrary execution of the nt protocol versions.  
  B. Current Approach Setting, Requirements and Objectives  
  The results illustrated in [23] are just the beginning of this 
challenging research problem. There is still ample scope for 
improvement, as long as all these solutions are just 
approximations. More importantly, the model used in [23] is 
very particular and does not realistically represent the general 
multi-hop ad hoc network, where the path between two 
members may include non-members relays too. Our objective 
in our current work is to continue our investigation on more 
efficient approximations, on a far more general network model 
however, the specifications of which we provide next. 
  We maintain the assumptions of the previous section except 
for the model of the network graph, with which we essentially 
delineate our methods and solutions from the previous. In our 
network model we allow non-member relays as well in the 
routing path between two group members. We assume a generic 
Dijkstra routing protocol that finds the shortest paths between 
members. Through the underlying routing, each member 
obtains the routing path(s) to its closest neighbor(s). We 
dynamically determine the proximity with respect to the 
number of hops between two members. If no neighbors are 
found in the proximity, the search diameter (TTL) is gradually 
expanded until a pre-agreed number of members are found. So, 
two members i, j are considered “virtually connected” if they 
share at least a routing path Ri,j with length up to a pre-defined 
threshold that depends on the TTL (including possibly non-
members). It holds that Ri, j≤ Th (TTL). Assuming that a direct 
link between two network nodes has weight 1, the virtual link 
between two virtually connected members may take any value x 
≤ Th (TTL). We now allow the existence of arbitrary weights 
between any two group members that are assumed connected. 
Hence, the secure group connectivity graph is defined as G(V, 
E, w), where E∈V×V, and w is the edge weight function that 
maps any virtual edge in this graph to an integer, so that w: (i, j) 
→Z*∩ [1, Th(TTL)], e(i, j)∈V×V. An edge between any two 
members (i, j) exists if and only if the two associated members 
share a path with size lower or equal to Th (TTL).   
 We now examine if it makes sense to apply the methods 
proposed in [23] to our new setting. These methods use a ST or 
equally MST formed strictly by the n group members and does 
not include any non-member relay. Obviously, this cannot be 
the case in our current setting, after the new definition of virtual 
connectivity. Constructing a ST that includes all n members of 
the secure group, will inevitably include an unprecedented 
number of non-member relays. Hence the size of the resulting 
ST will be unknown and most likely much greater than n. The 
edge weights between two virtually connected tree members 
depend on the size of the minimum path shared which is most 
likely greater than 1, unless there is a direct link between two 
members. It is obvious now however, that in this case the ST is 
not equivalent to an MST. Some of the previous techniques 
require the existence on an MST, so in our new setting we still 
need to compute an MST. Apart from this obvious difference, 
the most discouraging factor that prevents us from applying 
blindly the previous techniques to our new setting is the 
following: the number of nodes included in the new ST or MST 
may now be as large as the network size S. The previous 
approximations assumed a full walk over a ST of strictly n 
members, or a dilation of these n members by two, producing 
solutions that are better or equal than twice the optimal. The 
optimal in that case was n, which was indeed what we were 
after.  Since the size of the secure group is assumed to be much 
smaller than the size of the network, the above solutions are 
still acceptable for the metric functions of the protocols. In fact, 




protocols with these approximations. However, in the current 
setting, the same approximations would provide us with 
solutions that are better or equal than twice the size of the 
virtual ST, or MST with arbitrary weights, which could be the 
size of the whole network in the worst case scenario. The same 
is the case with the technique that uses dilation of group 
members, which becomes preventive for a growing member 
graph (the redundant communication and computation overhead 
produced becomes too high to be acceptable). Obviously, such 
solutions are far from satisfactory in our current setting and the 
quest for more efficient solutions is still on. At the same time, 
we seek lightweight solutions, so that the extra overhead 
required for the generation of the backbone framework is 
maintained as low as possible. Again, we stress the importance 
of limiting the total number of relays required for the execution 
of the KA protocols. The less the total number of relays, the 
less the side effects of routing on the standard communication 
are. Hence, this work carries on the previous study done on the 
topic, and also sets the specifications and standards higher for 
any contributions that will be made in the future. 
V. OVERVIEW OF NEW WT-GDH KA PROTOCOLS 
A.  MST Generation 
We generate a MST starting from any member, say A without 
loss of generality, by applying a distributed version of Prim’s 
algorithm. Prim’s method [25] is based on a greedy strategy, 
captured by a “generic” algorithm which grows the MST one 
edge at a time. The algorithm manages a set of edges H, 
maintaining the following loop invariant: prior to each iteration 
H is a subset of some MST. Prim’s algorithm has the property 
that the edges in H always form a single tree. This strategy is 
greedy since the tree is augmented at each step with an edge 
that contributes the minimum amount possible to the tree’s 
weight. In order to implement this algorithm as such, all 
members must have global information of the link weights of 
all other members, so that they all see which member in H has 
the minimum link weight and allow the growing MST to 
expand towards this direction. We adjust this algorithm to our 
distributed environment, by having each member that joins H 
report its candidate links to the root A. At each step, the root 
determines the next member J to join H by examining all 
unused candidate links of all members that currently belong to 
H. Then the root sends a Join Flag to member J, J joins H, and 
so on and so forth. It has been shown that the improved 
running time of the original Prim’s algorithm is:   
Lt1 = O(E + Vlog2V).  
Notation_6: Let the weighted path between any member J and 
the root A be denoted as RJ, A (or RJ,Rt). Also, let PKS denote 
the bit size of the packet that carries a member’s candidates’ 
information up to the root, and let KS denote the bit size of the 
Join Flag from the root to the next member that joins H. Since 
KS is the size of a control packet, we safely assume that the 
following inequality holds: KS<<K.  
 The combined communication cost incurred to the network 
from the generation of the distributed MST becomes:  




∑ × (PKS + KS) 
CCost1(aux)≈ |V|×  (PKS+KS)×E(Rj,Rt)  
CCost1(aux)≈ 12 |V|×  (PKS+KS)×maxj(Rj,Rt)                 (1). 
The associated latency or running time for the adjustment of 
Prim’s algorithm becomes:  




∑ ≈ 2× |V|× avg(Rj,Rt)  
Lt2≈ 2× |V| × 12 ×  maxj (Rj, Rt) ≈ |V| ×  maxj (Rj, Rt). 
The running time of the adjusted algorithm in total becomes:  
Lt1 + Lt2 = O(E +Vlog2V) + |V| ×maxj (Rj, Rt), 
Lt1 + Lt2 = O(E +V (log2V + maxj (Rj, Rt)))                     (2). 
B. MST Manipulation 
Until now, we have generated a MST starting from member A. 
A full walk on this MST will provide us with a Hamiltonian 
path or tour with cost CMST < 2COPT. We will investigate if we 
can do better than that for GDH.1, GDH.2, and ING that are 
logically deployed on a Hamiltonian path or ring respectively. 
Thus, we look for heuristics that produce better results than the 
closest point heuristic or the full walk on an MST with triangle 
inequality. We start with the following observation: if the 
generated MST was in fact a chain, then the desired 
Hamiltonian path would be directly provided and would result 
in the same cost as this of the MST. Hence, the more the 
resulting MST resembles a single chain, the less the cost of the 
resulting Hamiltonian path (not tour) is expected to be. Based 
on this observation, we initiate the manipulation of the MST 
with the following transformation: During the formation of 
the MST the two longest distinct paths from all group 
members to the root are located. The group member that marks 
the end of the longest path becomes now the new root of the 
transformed MST, and the associations between parents and 
offspring in the existing MST are sequentially altered to 
accommodate the transformed tree. This process results in 
unfolding the MST to its longest path or else in “extracting” 
the largest possible “path” from the MST (Fig. 1(b), 1(c)).  
  Next, each member that belongs to the new ST, recursively 
rearranges its offspring in the order of increasing distances 
(number of hops including relays) from their tree leaves (Fig. 
1(d)). It is obvious that the backbone of the tree, which is the 
previously unfolded path, will be accessed last by a pre-order 
tree traversal. It can be directly seen that in the case we want to 
generate a Hamiltonian path from this ST tree, all members 
that belong to the “unfolded” path will be visited only once. 
No recursions occur on the unfolded path. Hence, the longer 
the unfolded path is, the less the number of members that will 
be revisited is. Consequently, this modification results in the 
reduction in the routing overhead for the Hamiltonian path 
formed. This is also the intuitive idea behind the use of this 
heuristic for protocols GDH.1, GDH.2, and ING.  
  In the case of GDH.1 and GDH.2, the benefit from having 
each member in the transformed MST recursively rearrange its 
offspring is even greater. For the upward stage of GDH.1-2, 
the MST is traversed as indicated by the Minimum Point 




the offspring of every member arranged in increasing order of 
distances. Along the lines of a greedy strategy, we select to fix 
the backward GDH.1-2 schedule first. For that, we assign each 
of the n group members with a unique sequential id from 
Z*∩ [0, n-1]. That is, we perform a pre-order visit of the MST 
by assigning session ids from the highest to the lowest one, as 
we traverse the virtual tree. For example, the first member 
encountered in our pre-order walk, say F, is assigned with id = 
(n-1), the second member encountered, say L, is assigned with 
id = (n-2), etc.  Then, when GDH.1-2 is executed, member F 
will be the last visited in the upward stage (or the first to 
initiate the backward), and member L will be the predecessor 
of F. By fixing the backward schedule first via a pre-order 
MST traversal, we ensure that the members carrying the 
longest KM material are accommodated first. Hence, we still 
act along the lines of a greedy strategy. Among siblings, the 
following invariant is true: the higher the newly assigned id of 
a sibling, the fewer amount of hops (relays) a message 
originating from this sibling will go through until the 
destination is reached (successor or predecessor). The new id 
assigned to a member corresponds also to the number of 
elements (KM data) the member must communicate to its 
successor or predecessor. Thus, among siblings, the longer the 
message, the less number of relays it involves. We stress again 
that we aim in improving the metrics of interest for the studied 
protocols by manipulating the MST with simple, lightweight, 
but effective heuristics, like the ones proposed. Below, we 











Fig 1: Manipulation of a MST: Transformation by unfolding it to the longest 
path and recursive re-ordering of each member’s offspring. 













Fig 1(c): MST unfolded to its largest path 
Fig 1(d): Re-arrange offspring from smaller to largest path 
1) Construct MST using distributed Prim (nodes report 
candidate links to the root which determines the next link. 
2) Transform MST by deploying (unfolding) its largest 
path, modify all parent-offspring associations properly 
3) Recursively re-arrange all offspring visited in 
increasing distances from MST leaves (case of GDH.1-2) 
VI. ANALYSIS OF NEW AUXILIARY FRAMEWORK  
The two longest distinct paths are determined along with the 
initial MST formation. The root stores information about the 
two members whose distances from the root are currently the 
longest, and follow two distinct paths to the root. Based on the 
next candidate that joins the evolving subset H, the root 
updates its related information accordingly. Thus, no extra 
communication overhead or latency is incurred to the network 
for this operation. After the two longest paths are determined, 
the root notifies the member that will serve as the new root, say 
member C. Starting now from C all members sequentially alter 
their parent-offspring association accordingly. This running 
time for this operation depends on the length of the new 
unfolded path (UP), i.e. RUP = RC,D, as illustrated in Fig 1(c).  
Then, the associated latency becomes:  Lt3 = RUP               (3). 
The associated communication overhead becomes:  
CCost2 (aux) = Weight (MST)×KS  = W(MST)×KS            (4). 
  For the re-ordering process, each offspring recursively 
notifies its parent of its distance from the related tree leaf. For 
example, if member F collects the maximum distances of all 
offspring from the tree leaves, it picks the maximum among 
these values, adds its own link weight towards its parent, and 
sends this information to its own parent, say member B. B will 
collect similar information from all offspring, and so on and so 
forth. Each parent stores this information and applies a sorting 
algorithm to its offspring (i.e. QuickSort) to virtually reorder 
them for the coming pre-order traversal. The sorting 
calculations can be executed independently from the maximum 
distance propagation up to the root. The overhead incurred 
from this operation is the same as before: 
CCost3 (aux) = W(MST)×KS   (5),           and Lt4 = RUP      (6). 
Notation_7: Let Rmax = maxi,j(Rj, i) be the longest virtual link 
between any two virtually connected members.  
Overall, the communication cost and latency for the generation 
of the core framework becomes approximately:  
CCost (aux) = CCost1(aux) + CCost2(aux) + CCost3(aux)  
 CCost(aux)= | |2
V ×maxj (Rj, Rt)× (PKS+KS)+2×W(MST)×KS , 
CCost (aux) < 12 |V|
2×Rmax× (PKS+KS)+2|V|×Rmax×KS ,  
CCost (aux) < |V|×Rmax× ( 12 |V|× (PKS +KS) + 2 KS)          (7). 
Lt = Lt1 + Lt2 + Lt3 + Lt4   
Lt = O(E +V (log2V + maxj (Rj, Rt) )) + 2×RUP . 
Lt < O(E +V (log2V + |V|×Rmax )) + 2×2|V|×Rmax  
Lt <O(E + |V log2V| + ( |V|2 + 4|V|)×Rmax ))                        (8). 
 We will now attempt to capture the auxiliary overhead more 





















analytical results. Furthermore, through our simulations, we 
will measure the exact communication overhead and latency of 
the execution of studied KA protocols based on the new core 
framework. We will compare these new wt protocol versions 
with the previous nt-versions, again by our simulations. 
VII. WT-GDH VS. ORIGINAL NT-GDH SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. Simulations Set-Up  
We have conducted simulations in order to compare the routing 
cost of wt-(GDH.1, GDH.2, and ING) vs. their original versions 
over ad hoc multi-hop networks. We use different graphs to 
generate the secure subgroups and analyze the performance of 
the various algorithms. Our network graph represents a single 
cluster area where a single group is deployed. A number of 
nodes from this graph are randomly selected as group members. 
The group leader is randomly selected. At the end of the group 
“registration” period, the sponsor piggybacks the list of the 
legitimate members into the routing packets. We assume a 
generic Dijkstra routing protocol that finds the shortest paths 
between members. Through the underlying routing, each 
member obtains the routing path(s) to its closest neighbor(s). 
We dynamically determine the proximity with respect to the 
number of hops between two members. If no neighbors are 
found in the proximity, the search diameter (TTL) is gradually 
expanded until a pre-agreed number of members are found. 
  We further assume that while the backbone framework is 
being formed, the relative placement of members and 
consequently the proximity lists do not change significantly. 
Such a change could result in a different “optimal” solution, 
and the one currently generated would become outdated and 
probably suboptimal. However, our algorithm is fairly fast. So, 
it is not too optimistic to assume that the topological changes 
that occur do not “offset” our solution much from the target 
solution. Of course, it is expected that the higher the mobility 
of nodes, the worse the performance of our algorithm is. Even 
though the wt-versions are more sensitive to mobility than the 
original schemes, they still reduce significantly CCost and Lt, 
even if the generated schedule is not currently optimal. On the 
other hand, the backbone framework can be periodically 
reconfigured, in order to capture all dynamic changes and 
reflect them to the wt protocol executions. The frequency of 
this reconfiguration depends on the dynamics of the network 
(i.e. nodes’ mobility profiles, rate under which the network 
topology changes due to mobility, disruptions, battery 
drainage, etc.), and on the available network resources. It also 
depends on our own specifications and requirements for the 
performance of the schemes. For example, the auxiliary 
framework may be recalculated whenever the performance of a 
given protocol degrades to the median of the best execution 
(the first one after the auxiliary framework reconfiguration) 
and of the average execution of the original nt scheme. 
  For our evaluation, we generated various random graphs for a 
given input of the number of nodes n and the number of 
members m. For the same graph and the same input, we have 
varied the subgroup configuration, i.e., we have selected the n 
members in a random manner. For each graph of input <n, m> 
and for each subgroup configuration, we have evaluated the 
three metrics of interest (CCost, RCost, Lt) of the wt-versions 
vs. the nt-versions (original), and we have averaged the results 
for all random graphs with the same inputs <n, m>. We have 
tested the following cluster-subgroup scenarios:  
Cluster Size: [100,…, 600],      Subgroup Size: [8,…64].  
B. Simulation Results: 
  We illustrate in the following graphs some indicative results 
on the communication and routing overhead produced by the 
studied protocols and their new wt versions, measured in terms 
of the total number of hops required for the protocols to 
successfully terminate. The KM messaging is very heavy for 
the network nodes, so our aim is to reduce the overall number 
of bits (or packets) required and relieve as many nodes as 
possible from “relaying” large keying data. This is indeed the 
case with the new versions: they achieve significant savings in 
terms of routing and consequently communication cost.  
The following graphs reflect a number of important metrics 
that justify the value of our new wt-algorithms: (a) the 
combined communication overhead (CCost) of the wt-versions 
vs. the existing ones under various scenarios of secure group 
and network size, (b) the routing overhead  (RCost) of the wt-
versions vs. the existing ones under various scenarios of secure 
group and network size, and (c) the communication and 
computation overhead required for the generation of the 
auxiliary framework (CCost(aux), CompCost(aux)), under 
various scenarios of secure group and network size. The 
graphs in cases (a) and (b) are all scaled by a factor K, while 
those in (c) represent actual values of the auxiliary framework.  
The routing and communication overhead is significantly 
reduced in all the scenarios captured by our simulations. 
Indeed, the new schemes results in significant savings in terms 
of routing (and consequently communication) overhead, and in 
many cases the associated ratio is:  
RCOMM =
( _ , , )
( , , )
CCost ING Opt n S
CCost ING n S ≈
1
2 .  
We illustrate the above with an indicative arithmetic example: 
for a subgroup of size 32, and a network of size 200, the 
averaged relays produced (RCost or equivalently CCost) are 
1215 for ING_Opt, and 2595 for ING, and hence RCOMM < 12 .  
Furthermore, we are able to verify that the communication and 
computation costs resulting from the auxiliary framework of the 
wt-versions match our analytical results. Indeed, let us for 
example recall the analytical formula we derived for estimating 
the CCost (aux) metric:  
CCost (aux) < |V|×Rmax× ( 12 |V|× (PKS +KS) + 2 KS)          (7). 
Assuming that the maximum number of neighbors for each 
member is 10-12 (verified from our simulations as well), and 
having set KS = 8, we select PKS = 8×12 = 96 (bit size of 
control packet×maximum number of neighbors) Also, we 
select Rmax = 8, and obtain the following expression for (7):  
CCost (aux) < 8|V |× (52|V |+16).  
By evaluating this expression for a subgroup of 32 members we 
obtain: CCost (aux, V=32) < 430,080 bits. Indeed our results 
verify that this upper bound holds, since some indicative values 




the following: CCost (aux, n=32, S=200) = 336977 bits,  CCost 
(aux, n=32, S=300) = 395881 bits, CCost (aux, n=32, S=400) = 
256436 bits. The same is the case with the rest of the group 
sizes we have included in our simulations. We should also 
observe that CCost (aux) increases as the network size grows, 
until the network reaches some threshold value. Then, the 
corresponding metric starts decreasing. The reasoning behind 
this behavior is the following: two members are considered 
“connected” until the hop distance between them (TTL) reaches 
a certain threshold. After this threshold is exceeded, the 
members are considered disconnected. As the network size 
increases, the density of subgroup members decreases, and 
naturally the “neighbors” of each member decrease, as 
expected. The less the neighbors of each node are, the lower 
CCost(aux) and CompCost(aux) quantities become.  
 In addition, we also verify that the metrics associated with 
the auxiliary framework are kept reasonably low and add little 
to the overall overhead produced by the execution of the wt-
versions, even under a growing secure group and/or network 
size. On the other hand, the control messages used for the 
generation of the framework have size KS<<K. Acceptable bit 
lengths for K are above 2048 bits so that a KM protocol can be 
considered computationally secure to-date. We illustrate the 
above with an indicative arithmetic example: We have found 
that avg (CCost (ING_Opt, n=32, S=300) = 3925, avg (CCost 
(ING, n=32, S = 300) = 5976, and avg (CCost (aux, ING, n = 
32, S = 300) = 395881. It can be seen that the larger the 
constant K becomes, the bigger the difference in the overhead 
of ING_Opt vs. ING becomes. However, even if we assume 
that the bit size of K is as small as 1024 bits, we obtain the 
following results: CCost (ING_Opt + aux) = 3925×1024 + 
395,881 = 4,019,200 + 395,881 = 4,415,081 bits, while CCost 
(ING) = 5976×1024 = 6,619,424. Obviously, the difference in 
the overall overhead (including the auxiliary overhead for the 
case of wt-ING) is considerable, even under this worst case 
scenario (small K, highest observed CCost(aux)). The 
difference in the overall overhead becomes even more 
impressive if GDH.1 is considered. We emphasize again that a 
new framework needs not be computed every time a wt-KA 
protocol is executed. We can re-compute the framework 
periodically. Hence, the impact of the framework overhead on 
the overall cost of our algorithms is even lower in practice. 
Communication cost of ING_Opt vs. ING from 100 
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Fig 1: Total Communication cost (CCost) produced by ING_Opt vs. ING, for 
Subgroup size n = 16, and network size S = 100, for 100 different graph 
configurations. ING_Opt results in substantially superior performance for the 
vast majority of different graph configurations. 
Fig 2: CCost of ING_Opt vs. ING w.r.t. group size <16,…, 64>, in a network of 
size <100, 200>. ING_Opt demonstrates a considerably superior performance. 
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C o m p u t a t io n  C o s t  o f  I N G  a u x .  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  
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Figs 3, 4: CCost(aux) (bits) [3], and CompCost(aux) (bits) [4] for ING_Opt, for 
an increasing group size <16,…,64>,  for three different scenarios of network 
size: S1=<100,200>, S2 = < 150, 400>, S3 = <200, 500>. The corresponding 
costs increase with the group size. They also increase with the network size up 
to a certain threshold, as discussed. 
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Figs 5, 6: CCost of GDH.1_Opt vs. GDH.1 for the following scenarios: (1) for 
100 different subgroup configurations on a network of 100 nodes (100 different 
runs) for a subgroup size of 16 members, (2) comparison w.r.t. the number of 
members [16, 32, 64] in large network of [200,…, 500] nodes. The performance 
of our algorithm is significantly superior in the vast majority of cases, and this 
reflects on the average case as well. The ratio of improvement in these cases 
becomes: 0.53 < RCOMM < 0.70. 
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Figs 7, 8: RCost (7) and CCost (8) of GDH.1_Opt vs. GDH.1 w.r.t. the number 
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Fig 9: GDH.1_Opt framework CCost (bits), for an increasing group size <16,…, 
64>,  for three different scenarios of network size: S1=<100, 200>, S2 = <150, 
400>, S3 = <200, 500>. The corresponding costs increase with the group size. 
They also increase with the network size up to a certain threshold. 
The behavior and performance of GDH.2 is similar to this of 
GDH.1, and we skip the related results for lack of space.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
   This paper focuses on the design and analysis of topology-
oriented versions of a number of the following DH-based KA 
protocols over wire-less multi-hop ad hoc networks: GDH.1, 
GDH.2, ING. We describe new methods for approximating 
(and potentially optimizing) the most significant metrics of 
interest associated with these protocols: the communication, 
routing, and latency functions. We introduce heuristics for 
generating topology-oriented communication schedules, on top 
of which the discussed protocols are executed. The algorithms 
introduced address generalized secure member graphs. On a 
generalized secure member graph, the notion of connectivity 
has been relaxed, i.e. the communication path between two 
members may as well include non-member relays, as long as 
the number of hops in the path is lower than a given threshold. 
The algorithms introduced in our previous work [23] were 
designed for fully connected secure member graphs. This 
specialized model however does not effectively capture a 
realistic, general multi-hop ad hoc network. Applying the 
methods suggested in [23] on the generalized graphs of our 
current study makes no sense in most cases or results in a 
substantial deterioration of the expected performance of the 
protocols. Hence, in this paper we re-designed the 
communication schedules of the given protocols by either 
extending our previous techniques, or proposing new ones, to 
address a totally generic network. The heuristics introduced 
achieve significantly better approximations of the metric 
functions we want to optimize. Our comparisons of the new 
topology oriented and the original KA schemes are done via 
simulations. The new protocols achieve a dramatic reduction in 
the communication and routing overhead.  
   We believe that there is scope for even more efficient 
topology oriented approaches and we consider efficient 
simulations of KA protocols over multi-hop ad hoc networks as 
an interesting open problem.  
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